{"title":"Balancing the Win-Sets: Agricultural Lobby and Japan’s Accession to the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement","authors":"K. Żakowski","doi":"10.15804/athena.2021.71.12","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Due to strong connections with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the agricultural lobby constituted a considerable obstacle in liberalization of trade by Japan� Nevertheless, in the last years, its influence on governmental policy has been waning� Referring to the theory of two-level games, the article analyzes the discourse on accession to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement to examine the weakening dependence of Japanese politicians on support from the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives� It is argued that the Japanese government managed to sign both the TPP Agreement in 2016 and its successor, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2018, thanks to the institutional strength and negotiation strategy of the Abe administration� — ABSTRAKT —","PeriodicalId":114578,"journal":{"name":"Athenaeum Polskie Studia Politologiczne","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Athenaeum Polskie Studia Politologiczne","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.15804/athena.2021.71.12","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Due to strong connections with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the agricultural lobby constituted a considerable obstacle in liberalization of trade by Japan� Nevertheless, in the last years, its influence on governmental policy has been waning� Referring to the theory of two-level games, the article analyzes the discourse on accession to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement to examine the weakening dependence of Japanese politicians on support from the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives� It is argued that the Japanese government managed to sign both the TPP Agreement in 2016 and its successor, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2018, thanks to the institutional strength and negotiation strategy of the Abe administration� — ABSTRAKT —