Anti-Dumping in Dispute Settlement: The Trade Predator’s Persistent Dilemma – National Tribunals, Square Shooters or a Minefield of Bias?

Abstract

The paper provides an empirical overview of anti-dumping measures from 1994-2011, anti-dumping initiatives north v. south and south-south and the targeting of China’s many export industries. The conclusion is that anti-dumping is often stigmatized by economists and trade lawyers as ‘rule rigging’, but governments continue to rely on this policy instrument to protect jobs and industries from abnormally cheap goods flooding the market. Trade centric ties between countries have tightened and states are more globalized than ever before. Deep integration has forced governments to manage their openness and as countries are in a race to compete, those who come out on top do better to have the state address the far-reaching imbalance of trade centric growth and the asymmetries in market prowess between countries. In the recent period China has been much more active in bringing antidumping suit against its competitors and major trading partners but it is by far and away more a target than a complainant. Member states will continue to bring disputes to the WTO in very small numbers. By contrast, anti-dumping and countervail measures and duties are an alternative dispute settlement mechanism and the organization of international trade has become more politicized. Countries will continue to file complaints with the WTO and launch investigations into predatory pricing practices before their national tribunals. Legally sanctioned protectionism has become a prominent feature of international trade at a time of intense globalization despite the expert advice of lawyers and economists to shut it down. Anti-dumping investigations before national tribunals have long been a right of governments to insulate their economies against highly volatile conditions in the international environment that distort the transactions of a world trading system.