Preferential Credit Treatment, Bond Valuations, and Distressed Exchanges

C. Sarmiento
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Abstract

This paper uses Duffie and Singleton (1999) discount model for defaultable bonds to infer the presence of a preferential credit treatment (PCT) for Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) in loss given default (LGD) space. The main inferences from the paper are twofold. -1- Lower lending fees in MDBs loans relative to private lenders generate a significant PCT. That is, a refinancing of a loan would be less severe for loans that already encompass a subsidized coupon. -2- Non-concessional loans have lower LGDs than concessional loans. This is consistent with the premise that non-concessional lending help financing concessional loans. Overall, our conceptualization of the problem supports an explanation for the preferential treatment of MDBs, even under the assumption of no seniority for MDBs loans relative to private loans.
优惠信贷待遇、债券估值和不良交易
本文使用Duffie和Singleton(1999)的违约债券贴现模型来推断多边开发银行(mdb)在给定违约损失(LGD)空间中存在优惠信贷待遇(PCT)。这篇论文的主要推论有两个方面。-多边开发银行贷款的贷款费用相对于私人贷款机构较低,可产生可观的PCT。也就是说,对于已经包含补贴息票的贷款,再融资的难度将较低。-2-非优惠贷款的lgd低于优惠贷款。这与非优惠贷款帮助融资优惠贷款的前提是一致的。总的来说,我们对这个问题的概念化支持对多边开发银行优惠待遇的解释,即使在多边开发银行贷款相对于私人贷款没有优先级的假设下也是如此。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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