Eat & Tell: A Randomized Trial of Random-Loss Incentive to Increase Dietary Self-Tracking Compliance

Palakorn Achananuparp, Ee-Peng Lim, Vibhanshu Abhishek, Tianjiao Yun
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

A growing body of evidence has shown that incorporating behavioral economics principles into the design of financial incentive programs helps improve their cost-effectiveness, promote individuals» short-term engagement, and increase compliance in health behavior interventions. Yet, their effects on long-term engagement have not been fully examined. In study designs where repeated administration of incentives is required to ensure the regularity of behaviors, the effectiveness of subsequent incentives may decrease as a result of the law of diminishing marginal utility. In this paper, we introduce random-loss incentive -- a new financial incentive based on loss aversion and unpredictability principles -- to address the problem of individuals» growing insensitivity to repeated interventions over time. We evaluate the new incentive design by conducting a randomized controlled trial to measure the influences of random losses on participants» dietary self-tracking and self-reporting compliance using a mobile web application called Eat & Tell. The results show that random losses are significantly more effective than fixed losses in encouraging long-term engagement.
吃和告诉:随机损失激励增加饮食自我跟踪依从性的随机试验
越来越多的证据表明,将行为经济学原理纳入财务激励计划的设计有助于提高其成本效益,促进个人的短期参与,并增加健康行为干预的依从性。然而,它们对长期参与的影响尚未得到充分研究。在研究设计中,为了确保行为的规律性,需要反复实施激励措施,随后的激励措施的有效性可能会由于边际效用递减规律而降低。在本文中,我们引入了随机损失激励——一种基于损失厌恶和不可预测性原则的新型财务激励——来解决个人对反复干预越来越不敏感的问题。我们通过进行一项随机对照试验来评估新的激励设计,以衡量随机损失对参与者饮食自我跟踪和自我报告依从性的影响,使用一个名为Eat & Tell的移动网络应用程序。结果表明,在鼓励长期参与方面,随机损失明显比固定损失更有效。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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