The Economics of Scale-Up

Jonathan M. V. Davis, Jonathan Guryan, K. Hallberg, Jens Ludwig
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引用次数: 36

Abstract

Most randomized controlled trials (RCT) of social programs test interventions at modest scale. While the hope is that promising programs will be scaled up, we have few successful examples of this scale-up process in practice. Ideally we would like to know which programs will work at large scale before we invest the resources to take them to scale. But it would seem that the only way to tell whether a program works at scale is to test it at scale. Our goal in this paper is to propose a way out of this Catch-22. We first develop a simple model that helps clarify the type of scale-up challenge for which our method is most relevant. Most social programs rely on labor as a key input (teachers, nurses, social workers, etc.). We know people vary greatly in their skill at these jobs. So social programs, like firms, confront a search problem in the labor market that can lead to inelastically-supplied human capital. The result is that as programs scale, either average costs must increase if program quality is to be held constant, or else program quality will decline if average costs are held fixed. Our proposed method for reducing the costs of estimating program impacts at large scale combines the fact that hiring inherently involves ranking inputs with the most powerful element of the social science toolkit: randomization. We show that it is possible to operate a program at modest scale n but learn about the input supply curves facing the firm at much larger scale (S × n) by randomly sampling the inputs the provider would have hired if they operated at scale (S × n). We build a simple two-period model of social-program decision making and use a model of Bayesian learning to develop heuristics for when scale-up experiments of the sort we propose are likely to be particularly valuable. We also present a series of results to illustrate the method, including one application to a real-world tutoring program that highlights an interesting observation: The noisier the program provider’s prediction of input quality, the less pronounced is the scale-up problem.
扩大规模的经济学
大多数社会项目的随机对照试验(RCT)在适度规模上测试干预措施。虽然我们希望有前途的项目能够扩大规模,但在实践中,我们几乎没有这种扩大规模过程的成功例子。理想情况下,我们希望在投入资源将其规模化之前,知道哪些项目将大规模运作。但是,判断一个程序是否在规模上有效的唯一方法似乎是在规模上进行测试。我们在本文中的目标是提出一种摆脱这种第22条军规的方法。我们首先开发了一个简单的模型,它有助于澄清我们的方法最相关的放大挑战类型。大多数社会项目依赖劳动力作为关键投入(教师、护士、社会工作者等)。我们知道,在这些工作中,人们的技能差别很大。因此,社会项目和企业一样,在劳动力市场上面临着寻找问题,这可能导致人力资本供应缺乏弹性。结果是,随着程序的扩展,如果保持程序质量不变,要么平均成本必须增加,否则如果保持平均成本不变,程序质量将下降。我们提出的降低大规模评估项目影响成本的方法,结合了这样一个事实,即招聘本身就涉及到对输入进行排序,以及社会科学工具包中最强大的元素:随机化。我们表明,可以适度规模经营项目n但了解公司面临的输入供给曲线在更大的规模(S×n)通过随机采样输入提供者会聘请了如果他们经营规模(S×n)。我们构建一个简单的两期模型的社会项目决策和使用贝叶斯学习模型来开发启发式当扩大实验的提出可能是特别有价值的。我们还提供了一系列结果来说明该方法,其中包括一个应用于现实世界的辅导计划,该计划突出了一个有趣的观察结果:计划提供者对输入质量的预测越嘈杂,规模放大问题就越不明显。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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