A Bargaining Theory of Malevolence: The 2019 Pulwama War

Abstract

Economic theorizations of malevolence as laid out in Bargaining Theory (Anderton and Carter 2009) have discussed how grievances over perceived injustices can alter the utility functions, settlement net resources, and therefore the propensity and calculus of war between two nations. To put this assertion to the test, this working paper examines the Pulwama War and the India-Pakistan standoff of 2019 from a malevolence perspective. It also contrasts this with political bias in bargaining theory (Chohan 2019) in the same case study. The findings of the working paper indicate that the Indian government’s expediency of war may resonate with a malevolence perspective, but the political bias of bargaining theory, as theorized in the game-theoretic economic literature, has greater explanatory power and relevance.