Making Outcomes Matter: An Immodest Proposal for a New Consumer Financial Regulatory Paradigm

Todd H. Baker, C. Stone
{"title":"Making Outcomes Matter: An Immodest Proposal for a New Consumer Financial Regulatory Paradigm","authors":"Todd H. Baker, C. Stone","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3607308","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"American consumers today access financial services in fragmented, product-specific marketplaces in which each provider optimizes its consumer relationships based on profitability. Providers regularly exploit information advantages, geographical proximity, behavioral biases, high “shopping costs” and other asymmetries. Consumers, under pressure to make quick personal decisions, frequently make suboptimal or affirmatively damaging choices that benefit the provider and constrain the consumers’ options in follow-on decisions. The responsibility for managing outcomes in consumer financial services is — absent the most egregious abuse — left in the hands of the individual consumer. These practices arguably have led to suboptimal outcomes for all consumers and high levels of financial insecurity among the most vulnerable populations. \n \nIn the face of these problems, state and federal governments have, over time, adopted a variety of statutory and regulatory regimes intended to protect consumers. The resulting system of consumer financial regulation has had an inconsistent record in advancing the interests of consumers, particularly more vulnerable lower-income consumers, despite the existence of large bodies of law and regulation, extensive consumer disclosure, the enforcement efforts of dozens of state and federal regulatory agencies and an enormous investment in regulatory compliance by financial services providers. The system has historically operated in a data vacuum where regulators had little insight into the results of product usage, relying instead on disclosure-based regimes intended to inform consumer choice regarding product pricing and terms, narrow proscriptions regarding provider practices that impede informed decision-making and limited interventions regarding pricing or fees. \n \nThis situation has begun to change. Digitization and the ongoing “big data” revolution, coupled with the emergence of new measures of “financial health” outcomes, now make it possible to analyze the impact on individuals of the use of financial services. This, in turn, may allow historic regulatory regimes to be reimagined using these new data capabilities. Over time, a regulatory framework based upon outcomes measurement has the potential to supplement and ultimately replace the current system. \n \nSomething similar has begun to occur in the health care field, where insurers (and the state and federal governments that administer Medicare and Medicaid) represent powerful payor interests that are largely aligned with patient wellbeing. These health care market participants now use outcomes-based data to guide a wide range of medical practices and clinical decisions on the part of hospitals, physicians and medical service providers. Increasingly, a variety of standardized and publicly disclosed metrics enable payors to reward providers for lowering costs and improving patient outcomes. \n \nDrawing from the health care example, we advance a three-stage proposal to better align financial services provider interests with improved customer outcomes, through data analysis, public disclosure and market-based regulatory intervention. The proposal would introduce into the financial services marketplace a form of “outcomes-based regulation” that has been advanced elsewhere. Implementation of the new framework would not be an immediate substitute for existing consumer financial protection law; but by generating an empirical basis for identifying harms and benefits correlated with particular practices or product features, it would for the first time allow policymakers to measure the impact of statutory and regulatory interventions, determine product/practice “appropriateness” for particular consumer circumstances, and tailor policies to remedy harms incurred by users of particular products and/or providers. When fully tested and implemented, the three-stage process should shift provider incentives meaningfully towards improved customer outcomes, leading to a gradual shift away from prescriptive and disclosure-based regulation to a “learning” system that is principles-based, data-driven, transparent and leverages market mechanisms to deliver improved financial health for consumers.","PeriodicalId":269248,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Miscellaneous Consumer Matters (Topic)","volume":"136 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"LSN: Miscellaneous Consumer Matters (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3607308","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

Abstract

American consumers today access financial services in fragmented, product-specific marketplaces in which each provider optimizes its consumer relationships based on profitability. Providers regularly exploit information advantages, geographical proximity, behavioral biases, high “shopping costs” and other asymmetries. Consumers, under pressure to make quick personal decisions, frequently make suboptimal or affirmatively damaging choices that benefit the provider and constrain the consumers’ options in follow-on decisions. The responsibility for managing outcomes in consumer financial services is — absent the most egregious abuse — left in the hands of the individual consumer. These practices arguably have led to suboptimal outcomes for all consumers and high levels of financial insecurity among the most vulnerable populations. In the face of these problems, state and federal governments have, over time, adopted a variety of statutory and regulatory regimes intended to protect consumers. The resulting system of consumer financial regulation has had an inconsistent record in advancing the interests of consumers, particularly more vulnerable lower-income consumers, despite the existence of large bodies of law and regulation, extensive consumer disclosure, the enforcement efforts of dozens of state and federal regulatory agencies and an enormous investment in regulatory compliance by financial services providers. The system has historically operated in a data vacuum where regulators had little insight into the results of product usage, relying instead on disclosure-based regimes intended to inform consumer choice regarding product pricing and terms, narrow proscriptions regarding provider practices that impede informed decision-making and limited interventions regarding pricing or fees. This situation has begun to change. Digitization and the ongoing “big data” revolution, coupled with the emergence of new measures of “financial health” outcomes, now make it possible to analyze the impact on individuals of the use of financial services. This, in turn, may allow historic regulatory regimes to be reimagined using these new data capabilities. Over time, a regulatory framework based upon outcomes measurement has the potential to supplement and ultimately replace the current system. Something similar has begun to occur in the health care field, where insurers (and the state and federal governments that administer Medicare and Medicaid) represent powerful payor interests that are largely aligned with patient wellbeing. These health care market participants now use outcomes-based data to guide a wide range of medical practices and clinical decisions on the part of hospitals, physicians and medical service providers. Increasingly, a variety of standardized and publicly disclosed metrics enable payors to reward providers for lowering costs and improving patient outcomes. Drawing from the health care example, we advance a three-stage proposal to better align financial services provider interests with improved customer outcomes, through data analysis, public disclosure and market-based regulatory intervention. The proposal would introduce into the financial services marketplace a form of “outcomes-based regulation” that has been advanced elsewhere. Implementation of the new framework would not be an immediate substitute for existing consumer financial protection law; but by generating an empirical basis for identifying harms and benefits correlated with particular practices or product features, it would for the first time allow policymakers to measure the impact of statutory and regulatory interventions, determine product/practice “appropriateness” for particular consumer circumstances, and tailor policies to remedy harms incurred by users of particular products and/or providers. When fully tested and implemented, the three-stage process should shift provider incentives meaningfully towards improved customer outcomes, leading to a gradual shift away from prescriptive and disclosure-based regulation to a “learning” system that is principles-based, data-driven, transparent and leverages market mechanisms to deliver improved financial health for consumers.
使结果重要:一个新的消费者金融监管范式的不谦虚的建议
今天的美国消费者通过分散的、特定于产品的市场获得金融服务,在这些市场中,每个供应商都根据盈利能力优化其消费者关系。供应商经常利用信息优势、地理邻近、行为偏见、高“购物成本”和其他不对称。消费者在快速做出个人决定的压力下,经常做出次优或肯定有害的选择,这些选择有利于供应商,并限制了消费者在后续决策中的选择。在消费者金融服务中,管理结果的责任——没有最令人震惊的滥用行为——落在了消费者个人的手中。可以说,这些做法导致了所有消费者的次优结果,并在最脆弱的人群中造成了高度的财务不安全感。面对这些问题,州政府和联邦政府,随着时间的推移,采取了各种旨在保护消费者的法律和监管制度。由此产生的消费者金融监管体系在促进消费者,特别是更脆弱的低收入消费者的利益方面有着不一致的记录,尽管存在大量的法律和监管机构,广泛的消费者信息披露,数十个州和联邦监管机构的执法努力以及金融服务提供商在监管合规方面的巨大投资。该系统历来是在数据真空中运行的,监管机构对产品使用的结果知之甚少,而是依靠基于披露的制度,旨在告知消费者关于产品定价和条款的选择,对阻碍知情决策的供应商做法的狭隘禁止,以及对定价或费用的有限干预。这种情况已经开始改变。数字化和正在进行的"大数据"革命,加上出现了衡量"财务健康"成果的新措施,现在可以分析使用金融服务对个人的影响。反过来,这可能允许使用这些新的数据功能重新构想历史监管制度。随着时间的推移,基于结果衡量的监管框架有可能补充并最终取代当前的体系。医疗保健领域也开始出现类似的情况,保险公司(以及管理医疗保险和医疗补助的州和联邦政府)代表着强大的付款人利益,这些利益在很大程度上与患者的福祉保持一致。这些医疗保健市场参与者现在使用基于结果的数据来指导医院、医生和医疗服务提供者的广泛医疗实践和临床决策。越来越多的标准化和公开披露的指标使付款人能够奖励降低成本和改善患者预后的提供者。以医疗保健为例,我们提出了一个分三个阶段的建议,通过数据分析、公开披露和基于市场的监管干预,更好地将金融服务提供商的利益与改善的客户结果结合起来。该提案将在金融服务市场引入一种“基于结果的监管”形式,这种监管在其他地方已经得到了推广。新框架的实施不会立即取代现有的消费者金融保护法;但是,通过建立一个确定与特定做法或产品特征相关的危害和利益的经验基础,它将首次使政策制定者能够衡量法定和监管干预的影响,确定产品/做法对特定消费者情况的“适当性”,并调整政策以补救特定产品和/或供应商的用户所造成的损害。在充分测试和实施后,这一三阶段进程应将提供者的激励措施有意实实地转向改善客户结果,从而逐步从规范性和基于披露的监管转变为基于原则、数据驱动、透明并利用市场机制改善消费者财务健康的"学习"系统。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信