Popper’s Propensity Interpretation of Quantum Physics as a form of Modal Metaphysics

Basilis Dzelajei
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Abstract

With the emergence of quantum physics in the 1920s, the major philosophical question was, do the unobservables in quantum system have ontological status or are mere instruments for scientific prediction? The Copenhagen interpretation developed an instrumentalist thesis, contending that the unobservables are tools for making predictions concerning the observables. Thus, we cannot have knowledge of the quantum particles. However, Popper attempts a realist and an objective interpretation. As such, he criticizes the Copenhagen interpretation, developing the propensity view, which accords ontological status to subatomic particles. The main thrust of our argument in this paper is that by replacing probability possibilities with propensities, Popper positions himself as a proponent of the metaphysics of modality. It is then our objective to establish the parallelism between Popper’s Propensity Interpretation and Modal Metaphysics.  To establish this contention we proceeded analytically: firstly by situating the seismic shift from macro to quantum physics, secondly by examining Popper’s critique of the Copenhagen Interpretation and thirdly by attempting a demonstration of the correlation between Popper’s propensity interpretation and modal metaphysics. The merit of this paper resides in its elucidation of the importance of metaphysics in science. It is a double challenge at the same time for antimetaphysical philosophy of science and for antiscientific metaphysics, to rethink the relationship between Metaphysics and science and invest in finding how both disciplines nurture each other. Finally, it is hoped that policy makers in Philosphy and science uses our findings to revamp the conceptualisation and practice of interdisciplinarity.  
波普尔对量子物理学的倾向解释是模态形而上学的一种形式
随着20世纪20年代量子物理学的出现,主要的哲学问题是,量子系统中的不可观测物是具有本体论地位还是仅仅是科学预测的工具?哥本哈根解释发展了一种工具主义的论点,认为不可观测物是对可观测物进行预测的工具。因此,我们不可能拥有量子粒子的知识。然而,波普尔尝试的是一种现实主义和客观的解释。因此,他批判了哥本哈根诠释,发展了倾向观,认为亚原子粒子具有本体论地位。本文的主要论点是,通过用倾向取代概率可能性,波普尔将自己定位为形态形而上学的支持者。然后,我们的目标是建立波普尔的倾向解释和模态形而上学之间的平行关系。为了确立这一论点,我们进行了分析:首先,通过定位从宏观物理学到量子物理学的地震转移,其次,通过检查波普尔对哥本哈根解释的批评,第三,通过尝试证明波普尔的倾向解释与模态形而上学之间的相关性。本文的优点在于阐明了形而上学在科学中的重要性。反形而上学的科学哲学和反科学的形而上学同时面临着双重挑战,即重新思考形而上学与科学的关系,并致力于发现这两个学科如何相互促进。最后,希望哲学和科学领域的政策制定者能够利用我们的研究结果来改进跨学科的概念和实践。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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