PSI from Ring-OLE

Wutichai Chongchitmate, Y. Ishai, Steve Lu, R. Ostrovsky
{"title":"PSI from Ring-OLE","authors":"Wutichai Chongchitmate, Y. Ishai, Steve Lu, R. Ostrovsky","doi":"10.1145/3548606.3559378","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Private set intersection (PSI) is one of the most extensively studied instances of secure computation. PSI allows two parties to compute the intersection of their input sets without revealing anything else. Other useful variants include PSI-Payload, where the output includes payloads associated with members of the intersection, and PSI-Sum, where the output includes the sum of the payloads instead of individual ones. In this work, we make two related contributions. First, we construct simple and efficient protocols for PSI and PSI-Payload from a ring version of oblivious linear function evaluation (ring-OLE) that can be efficiently realized using recent ring-LPN based protocols. A standard OLE over a field F allows a sender with a,b F to deliver ax + b to a receiver who holds x F. Ring-OLE generalizes this to a ring F, in particular, a polynomial ring over F. Our second contribution is an efficient general reduction of a variant of PSI-Sum to PSI-Payload and secure inner product. Our protocols have better communication cost than state-of-the-art PSI protocols, especially when requiring security against malicious parties and when allowing input-independent preprocessing. Compared to previous maliciously secure PSI protocols that have a similar computational cost, our online communication is 2x better for small sets (28-212 elements) and 20% better for large sets (220 -224). Our protocol is also simpler to describe and implement. We obtain even bigger improvements over the state of the art (4-5x better running time) for our variant of PSI-Sum.","PeriodicalId":435197,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3548606.3559378","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3

Abstract

Private set intersection (PSI) is one of the most extensively studied instances of secure computation. PSI allows two parties to compute the intersection of their input sets without revealing anything else. Other useful variants include PSI-Payload, where the output includes payloads associated with members of the intersection, and PSI-Sum, where the output includes the sum of the payloads instead of individual ones. In this work, we make two related contributions. First, we construct simple and efficient protocols for PSI and PSI-Payload from a ring version of oblivious linear function evaluation (ring-OLE) that can be efficiently realized using recent ring-LPN based protocols. A standard OLE over a field F allows a sender with a,b F to deliver ax + b to a receiver who holds x F. Ring-OLE generalizes this to a ring F, in particular, a polynomial ring over F. Our second contribution is an efficient general reduction of a variant of PSI-Sum to PSI-Payload and secure inner product. Our protocols have better communication cost than state-of-the-art PSI protocols, especially when requiring security against malicious parties and when allowing input-independent preprocessing. Compared to previous maliciously secure PSI protocols that have a similar computational cost, our online communication is 2x better for small sets (28-212 elements) and 20% better for large sets (220 -224). Our protocol is also simpler to describe and implement. We obtain even bigger improvements over the state of the art (4-5x better running time) for our variant of PSI-Sum.
来自Ring-OLE的PSI
私有集交叉(PSI)是安全计算中研究最广泛的实例之一。PSI允许双方在不透露任何其他信息的情况下计算其输入集的交集。其他有用的变体包括PSI-Payload,其中输出包括与交集成员相关的有效载荷,以及PSI-Sum,其中输出包括有效载荷的总和而不是单个有效载荷。在这项工作中,我们做出了两个相关的贡献。首先,我们从一个环版本的遗忘线性函数求值(ring- ole)构造了简单有效的PSI和PSI- payload协议,该协议可以使用最近的基于环lpn的协议有效地实现。域F上的标准OLE允许具有A,b F的发送方向持有x F的接收方传递ax + b。ring -OLE将其推广到环F,特别是F上的多项式环。我们的第二个贡献是将PSI-Sum的变体有效地一般简化为PSI-Payload和安全内积。我们的协议比最先进的PSI协议具有更好的通信成本,特别是在需要针对恶意方的安全性和允许独立于输入的预处理时。与以前具有类似计算成本的恶意安全PSI协议相比,我们的在线通信在小集合(28-212个元素)上提高了2倍,在大集合(220 -224个)上提高了20%。我们的协议也更易于描述和实现。对于我们的PSI-Sum变体,我们获得了比最先进的状态更大的改进(运行时间提高4-5倍)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信