Method for Detecting Shilling Attacks Based on Implicit Feedback in Recommender Systems

Abstract

The problem of identifying shilling attacks, which are aimed at forming false ratings of objects in the recommender system, is considered. The purpose of such attacks is to include in the recommended list of items the goods specified by the attacking user. The recommendations obtained as a result of the attack will not correspond to customers' real preferences, which can lead to distrust of the recommender system and a drop in sales. The existing methods for detecting shilling attacks use explicit feedback from the user and are focused primarily on building patterns that describe the key characteristics of the attack. However, such patterns only partially take into account the dynamics of user interests. A method for detecting shilling attacks using implicit feedback is proposed by comparing the temporal description of user selection processes and ratings. Models of such processes are formed using a set of weighted temporal rules that define the relationship in time between the moments when users select a given object. The method uses time-ordered input data. The method includes the stages of forming sets of weighted temporal rules for describing sales processes and creating ratings, calculating a set of ratings for these processes, and forming attack indicators based on a comparison of the ratings obtained. The resulting signs make it possible to distinguish between nuke and push attacks. The method is designed to identify discrepancies in the dynamics of purchases and ratings, even in the absence of rating values at certain time intervals. The technique makes it possible to identify an approach to masking an attack based on a comparison of the rating values and the received attack indicators. When applied iteratively, the method allows to refine the list of profiles of potential attackers. The technique can be used in conjunction with pattern-oriented approaches to identifying shilling attacks