Panagiotis I. Radoglou-Grammatikis, Christos Dalamagkas, T. Lagkas, Magda Zafeiropoulou, Maria Atanasova, Pencho Zlatev, Alexandros-Apostolos A. Boulogeorgos, V. Argyriou, E. Markakis, I. Moscholios, P. Sarigiannidis
{"title":"False Data Injection Attacks against Low Voltage Distribution Systems","authors":"Panagiotis I. Radoglou-Grammatikis, Christos Dalamagkas, T. Lagkas, Magda Zafeiropoulou, Maria Atanasova, Pencho Zlatev, Alexandros-Apostolos A. Boulogeorgos, V. Argyriou, E. Markakis, I. Moscholios, P. Sarigiannidis","doi":"10.1109/GLOBECOM48099.2022.10000880","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The transformation of the conventional electrical grid into a digital ecosystem brings significant benefits, such as two-way communication between energy consumers and utilities, self-monitoring and pervasive controls. However, the advent of the smart electrical grid raises severe cybersecurity and privacy concerns, given the presence of legacy systems and communications protocols. This paper focuses on False Data Injection (FDI) cyberattacks against a low-voltage distribution system, taking full advantage of Man In The Middle (MITM) actions. The first cyberattack targets the communication between a smart meter and an Active Distribution Management System (ADMS), while the second FDI cyberattack targets the communication between a smart inverter and ADMS. In both cases, the cyberattacks affect the operation of the distribution transformer, thus resulting in devastating consequences. Moreover, this paper provides an Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS), detecting and mitigating the above cyberattacks in a timely manner. The evaluation results demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed IDS.","PeriodicalId":313199,"journal":{"name":"GLOBECOM 2022 - 2022 IEEE Global Communications Conference","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"GLOBECOM 2022 - 2022 IEEE Global Communications Conference","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/GLOBECOM48099.2022.10000880","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The transformation of the conventional electrical grid into a digital ecosystem brings significant benefits, such as two-way communication between energy consumers and utilities, self-monitoring and pervasive controls. However, the advent of the smart electrical grid raises severe cybersecurity and privacy concerns, given the presence of legacy systems and communications protocols. This paper focuses on False Data Injection (FDI) cyberattacks against a low-voltage distribution system, taking full advantage of Man In The Middle (MITM) actions. The first cyberattack targets the communication between a smart meter and an Active Distribution Management System (ADMS), while the second FDI cyberattack targets the communication between a smart inverter and ADMS. In both cases, the cyberattacks affect the operation of the distribution transformer, thus resulting in devastating consequences. Moreover, this paper provides an Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS), detecting and mitigating the above cyberattacks in a timely manner. The evaluation results demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed IDS.