{"title":"Equivalent current source of side-channel signal for countermeasure design with analog circuit simulator","authors":"T. Amano, K. Iokibe, Y. Toyota","doi":"10.1109/ISEMC.2012.6351661","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Side-channel attack is a cryptanalytic attack based on information gained from the physical implementation of a cryptographic IC. The simultaneous switching noise (SSN) current is generated as logic gates in cryptographic IC switch simultaneously in encryption processes. SSN current is a cause of electromagnetic interference (EMI). In this study, linear equivalent circuit modeling was examined for the sake of a developing method to evaluate cryptographic systems before fabrication. A linear equivalent circuit model of a cryptographic FPGA, in which an AES algorithm had been implemented, was determined from experimental measurements. The model was implemented into a commercial analog circuit simulator, and the SSN current was estimated under three configurations among which a decoupling circuit, used as a countermeasure, was changed. Estimated current traces were analyzed statistically by using the correlation power analysis (CPA) method to obtain correlation values, a major index security against side-channel attacks. Variation of the correlation values with a decoupling configuration agreed with the corresponding experimental results also obtained in this study. This means that the security of cryptographic devices against side-channel attacks based on analysis of the SSN current can be estimated by using the equivalent circuit model before fabrication.","PeriodicalId":197346,"journal":{"name":"2012 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2012 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ISEMC.2012.6351661","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Side-channel attack is a cryptanalytic attack based on information gained from the physical implementation of a cryptographic IC. The simultaneous switching noise (SSN) current is generated as logic gates in cryptographic IC switch simultaneously in encryption processes. SSN current is a cause of electromagnetic interference (EMI). In this study, linear equivalent circuit modeling was examined for the sake of a developing method to evaluate cryptographic systems before fabrication. A linear equivalent circuit model of a cryptographic FPGA, in which an AES algorithm had been implemented, was determined from experimental measurements. The model was implemented into a commercial analog circuit simulator, and the SSN current was estimated under three configurations among which a decoupling circuit, used as a countermeasure, was changed. Estimated current traces were analyzed statistically by using the correlation power analysis (CPA) method to obtain correlation values, a major index security against side-channel attacks. Variation of the correlation values with a decoupling configuration agreed with the corresponding experimental results also obtained in this study. This means that the security of cryptographic devices against side-channel attacks based on analysis of the SSN current can be estimated by using the equivalent circuit model before fabrication.