International Disputes of the IMF: A Review

Abstract

This article mainly analyses whether its benefits outweigh its harms or whether its harms outweigh its benefits. It reviews the literature from the two aspects of conditionality and IMF's internal defects. It concludes that from the perspective of conditionality, the conditions put forward by the IMF to a country are too rigid and not targeted. The reduction of social expenditure required by it leads to more serious social problems. Judging from the defects of the IMF itself, the IMF may be used by the government as a tool to persuade voters to a certain extent. Thus, it may indeed lead to moral hazard. The IMF's position as both lender and supervisor makes its policies ineffective. Furthermore a large number of documents point out that the United States and the G7 do benefit from the IMF and have great power. Finally, the paper analyzes the role of IMF in avoiding default. The summary and analysis of this paper hopes to contribute to the research in this field.