S. Musman, Mike Tanner, A. Temin, E. Elsaesser, Lewis Loren
{"title":"A systems engineering approach for crown jewels estimation and mission assurance decision making","authors":"S. Musman, Mike Tanner, A. Temin, E. Elsaesser, Lewis Loren","doi":"10.1109/CICYBS.2011.5949403","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Understanding the context of how IT contributes to making missions more or less successful is a cornerstone of mission assurance. This paper describes a continuation of our previous work that used process modeling to allow us to estimate the impact of cyber incidents on missions. In our previous work we focused on developing a capability that could work as an online process to estimate the impacts of incidents that are discovered and reported. In this paper we focus instead on how our techniques and approach to mission modeling and computing assessments with the model can be used offline to help support mission assurance engineering. The heart of our approach involves using a process model of the system that can be run as an executable simulation to estimate mission outcomes. These models not only contain information about the mission activities, but also contain attributes of the process itself and the context in which the system operates. They serve as a probabilistic model and stochastic simulation of the system itself. Our contributions to this process modeling approach have been the addition of IT activity models that document in the model how various mission activities depend on IT supported processes and the ability to relate how the capabilities of the IT can affect the mission outcomes. Here we demonstrate how it is possible to evaluate the mission model offline and compute characteristics of the system that reflect its mission assurance properties. Using the models it is possible to identify the crown jewels, to expose the systems susceptibility to different attack effects, and evaluate how different mitigation techniques would likely work. Being based on an executable model of the system itself, our approach is much more powerful than a static assessment. Being based on business process modeling, and since business process analysis is becoming popular as a systems engineering tool, we also hope our approach will push mission assurance analysis tasks into a framework that allows them to become a standard systems engineering practice rather than the “off to the side” activity it currently is.","PeriodicalId":436263,"journal":{"name":"2011 IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence in Cyber Security (CICS)","volume":"312 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2011-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"27","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2011 IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence in Cyber Security (CICS)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CICYBS.2011.5949403","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 27
Abstract
Understanding the context of how IT contributes to making missions more or less successful is a cornerstone of mission assurance. This paper describes a continuation of our previous work that used process modeling to allow us to estimate the impact of cyber incidents on missions. In our previous work we focused on developing a capability that could work as an online process to estimate the impacts of incidents that are discovered and reported. In this paper we focus instead on how our techniques and approach to mission modeling and computing assessments with the model can be used offline to help support mission assurance engineering. The heart of our approach involves using a process model of the system that can be run as an executable simulation to estimate mission outcomes. These models not only contain information about the mission activities, but also contain attributes of the process itself and the context in which the system operates. They serve as a probabilistic model and stochastic simulation of the system itself. Our contributions to this process modeling approach have been the addition of IT activity models that document in the model how various mission activities depend on IT supported processes and the ability to relate how the capabilities of the IT can affect the mission outcomes. Here we demonstrate how it is possible to evaluate the mission model offline and compute characteristics of the system that reflect its mission assurance properties. Using the models it is possible to identify the crown jewels, to expose the systems susceptibility to different attack effects, and evaluate how different mitigation techniques would likely work. Being based on an executable model of the system itself, our approach is much more powerful than a static assessment. Being based on business process modeling, and since business process analysis is becoming popular as a systems engineering tool, we also hope our approach will push mission assurance analysis tasks into a framework that allows them to become a standard systems engineering practice rather than the “off to the side” activity it currently is.