Executive Incentive Compatibility and Selection of Governance Mechanisms

Rong Xu, G. Zhang, Junyan Zhang, Zhigang Zheng
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引用次数: 5

Abstract

Executive incentive compatibility plays a crucial role in firm's selection of corporate governance mechanisms. We provide a simple model to explain why firms with enough executive incentive compatibility still prefer having external governance mechanisms, and firms with poor executive incentive compatibility have to rely on a combination of large investors monitoring and external governance. This model facilitates a better understanding of the co‐existence of the two governance mechanisms and also reconciles conflicting findings with respect to a substitutive and complementary relationship between the two governance mechanisms. Empirical evidence supports there is a substitutive relation between large investors monitoring and executive compensation.
高管激励兼容性与治理机制选择
高管激励兼容性在公司治理机制选择中起着至关重要的作用。我们提供了一个简单的模型来解释为什么具有足够高管激励兼容性的公司仍然倾向于外部治理机制,而高管激励兼容性较差的公司不得不依赖于大投资者监督和外部治理的组合。该模型有助于更好地理解两种治理机制的共同存在,并且还调和了关于两种治理机制之间替代和互补关系的冲突发现。实证证据表明,大投资者监督与高管薪酬之间存在替代关系。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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