Dealing with Let and Escaping Pakistan’s Nuclear Coercion

Abstract

Given Pakistan's strategic commitments and the risk aversion of policy-makers in the United States and India, what options exist for these states to deal with LeT specifically, or more generally, the problem of Pakistan's reliance upon terrorism as a key foreign policy tool? Admittedly, the options are few and not without risk. In this chapter, I lay out three broad sets of options: maintain the status quo; manage the narrow problem of LeT through enhanced counter-terrorism efforts and leadership decapitation; and develop a new complement of compellent policies to undermine Pakistan's heretofore successful nuclear coercion strategy. India cannot compel Pakistan to cease and desist from using terrorism as a tool of policy on its own; rather, the United States will have to assume the heaviest burden in this effort. However, there is important--if limited--space for Indian action even if the United States, per its historical record, declines to pursue this course of action