Analysis of Attack Activities for Honeypots Installation in Ethereum Network

Abstract

In recent years, blockchain-based cryptocurren-cies have attracted much attention. Attacks targeting cryptocurrencies and related services directly profit an attacker if successful. Related studies have reported attacks targeting configuration-vulnerable nodes in Ethereum using a method called honeypots to observe malicious user attacks. They have analyzed 380 million observed requests and showed that attacks had to that point taken at least 4193 Ether. However, long-term observations using honeypots are difficult because the cost of maintaining honeypots is high. In this study, we analyze the behavior of malicious users using our honeypot system. More precisely, we clarify the pre-investigation that a malicious user performs before attacks. We show that the cost of maintaining a honeypot can be reduced. For example, honeypots need to belong in Ethereum's P2P network but not to the mainnet. Further, if they belong to the testnet, the cost of storage space can be reduced.