Executive Stock Options, Missed Earnings Targets and Earnings Management

Abstract

This paper examines whether stock‐option grants explain missed earnings targets, including reported losses, earnings declines, and missed analysts' forecasts. Anecdotal evidence and surveys suggest that managers believe that missing an earnings target can cause stock‐price drops (Graham et al. 2006). Empirical studies corroborate this notion (Skinner and Sloan 2002; Lopez and Rees 2002). Thus, a missed target could benefit an executive via lower strike price on subsequent option grants. Prior option grant studies explore only general downward earnings management (Balsam et al. 2003; Baker et al. 2003), but our study is the first to explore whether option grants encourage missed earnings targets. Indeed, if missed targets drive the prior results, then the literature has failed to document an important negative outcome of stock‐option incentives. We use quarterly and annual data for fixed‐date options granted after firms announce they have missed earnings targets. We find that firms that miss earnings targe...