Game-Theoretic Approach for Partial Sharing of Information

Abstract

This paper presents an integrated methodology to support decision making in cooperation through interorganizational information sharing. The methodology employs game-theoretic approach to determine whether it is advantageous to share information in situations of 1) competition-cooperation and 2) co-opetition. The decision allows partial sharing of information which we quantify on a scale from 0 to 100%. The focus of this research is developing a methodology to determine the optimal strategy to assist decision makers so we limit the choices to three specific shapes for the payoff functions: linear, concave nonlinear, and convex nonlinear. These three types of function; however, capture human behavior. Linear, concave, and convex utility functions are employed for players who prefer risk-neutral, risk averse, and risk loving, respectively. Finally, examples are provided to illustrate how the methodology can be used in practice.