Mutual Fund Performance and the Incentive to Generate Alpha

Diane Del Guercio, J. Reuter
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引用次数: 266

Abstract

type="main"> To rationalize the well-known underperformance of the average actively managed mutual fund, we exploit the fact that retail funds in different market segments compete for different types of investors. Within the segment of funds marketed directly to retail investors, we show that flows chase risk-adjusted returns, and that funds respond by investing more in active management. Importantly, within this direct-sold segment, we find no evidence that actively managed funds underperform index funds. In contrast, we show that actively managed funds sold through brokers face a weaker incentive to generate alpha and significantly underperform index funds.
共同基金业绩与产生α的激励
为了合理化众所周知的积极管理共同基金平均表现不佳的现象,我们利用了不同细分市场的零售基金争夺不同类型投资者的事实。在直接向散户投资者销售的基金中,我们发现资金流追求风险调整后的回报,而基金的反应是更多地投资于主动管理。重要的是,在直销部分,我们没有发现积极管理基金表现不如指数基金的证据。相比之下,我们表明,通过经纪人销售的积极管理基金产生阿尔法的动力较弱,表现明显落后于指数基金。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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