Private attacks in longest chain proof-of-stake protocols with single secret leader elections

Sarah Azouvi, Daniele Cappelletti
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

Single Secret Leader Elections have recently been proposed as an improved leader election mechanism for proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchains. However, the security gain they provide has not been quantified. In this work, we present a comparison of PoS longest-chain protocols that are based on Single Secret Leader Elections (SSLE) - that elect exactly one leader per round - versus those based on Probabilistic Leader Elections (PLE) - where one leader is elected on expectation. Our analysis shows that when considering the private attack - the worst attack on longest-chain protocols [14] - the security gained from using SSLE is substantial: the settlement time is decreased by ~ 25% for a 33% or 25% adversary. Furthermore, when considering grinding attacks, we find that the security threshold is increased by 10% (from 0.26 in the PLE case to 0.36 in the SSLE case) and the settlement time is decreased by roughly 70% for a 20% adversary in the SSLE case.
最长链权益证明协议中单个秘密领导者选举的私人攻击
最近,单一秘密领导人选举被提议作为权益证明(PoS)区块链的改进领导人选举机制。然而,它们提供的安全收益还没有被量化。在这项工作中,我们比较了基于单秘密领导者选举(SSLE)的PoS最长链协议-每轮只选举一个领导者-与基于概率领导者选举(PLE)的PoS最长链协议-其中一个领导者是根据预期选举的。我们的分析表明,当考虑私有攻击时——对最长链协议的最严重攻击[14]——使用ssl获得的安全性是可观的:对于33%或25%的对手来说,结算时间减少了约25%。此外,当考虑研磨攻击时,我们发现安全阈值增加了10%(从PLE情况下的0.26增加到SSLE情况下的0.36),并且在SSLE情况下,20%的对手的结算时间减少了大约70%。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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