Study on Risk Control Strategy of Power Grid Material Quality under Moral Hazard Condition

Abstract

The quality of the power grid materials directly delivered to the construction site cannot be fully recognized by grid companies, and the suppliers will be driven by interests to violate the contract by cutting corners. Due to the lack of effective inspection of material quality, grid companies indirectly promote the increase of supplier moral hazard, and the material quality and safety risks increase accordingly. Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper studies the problem of how to control the quality risk of power grid materials under the condition of moral hazard, establishes a decision-making model of quality control for grid companies and suppliers, and considers the individual rational constraints of grid companies and suppliers, and makes an optimal solution to the model. The results show that under the moral hazard environment, the quality supervision of grid companies and the penalties for breach of contract and the quality control level of suppliers are different from the decision results under the condition of symmetric information. When the quality control level of suppliers is determined, the size of moral hazard depends on the difference between the internal quality assurance payment and the external quality assurance payment paid by the suppliers to the grid companies. The larger the difference, the greater the moral hazard. Grid companies should take into account their own income levels and control the moral hazard of suppliers, strengthen material quality supervision and management, increase the penalties for supplier’s breach of contract, and promote the healthy development of the grid material procurement market.