New Zealand

C. Leuprecht
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Abstract

As the smallest and most centralized in the Five Eyes community, New Zealand’s intelligence and security community, and the system that holds it accountable, is an outlier. New Zealand’s proximity to Australia is reflected in parallels in intelligence accountability between the two Tasman allies. On the one hand, its relatively smaller size is reflected in certain unique attributes of intelligence accountability, such as its limited scope and access to sensitive material. On the other hand, its more modest size has been beneficial in driving innovation that has subsequently been adopted elsewhere, notably the double lock system for warrants. The chapter reviews the member organizations of the New Zealand’s National Intelligence Community, the particular strategic environment that has informed intelligence and accountability in New Zealand, its rather distinct national security threats, as well as New Zealand’s modest, centralized yet innovative intelligence accountability architecture: the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security, which has an Advisory Panel that is an attribute unique to New Zealand, the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, and the Commissioner of Intelligence Warrants. New Zealand’s experience draws attention to economies of effort to be harnessed for scarce resources on the big collectors and assessor rather than other government clients that only receive intelligence. New Zealand also differs from other Five Eyes parliamentary intelligence committees in granting only limited access to sensitive operational matters or information. Mandatory regular review of legislation offers an opportunity to assess for efficacy and propose comprehensive improvements to innovate agencies and practices.
新西兰
作为“五眼联盟”中规模最小、中央集权程度最高的国家,新西兰的情报和安全机构,以及让其负责任的系统,是一个异类。新西兰与澳大利亚的邻近关系反映在这两个塔斯曼省盟友在情报责任方面的相似之处。一方面,其相对较小的规模反映在情报问责的某些独特属性上,例如其有限的范围和获取敏感材料的途径。另一方面,其较小的规模有利于推动创新,这些创新随后被其他地方采用,尤其是权证的双锁制度。本章回顾了新西兰国家情报机构的成员组织,新西兰情报和问责制的特殊战略环境,其相当独特的国家安全威胁,以及新西兰适度、集中但创新的情报问责架构。情报和安全监察长(该机构拥有新西兰独有的咨询小组)、议会情报和安全委员会以及情报授权专员。新西兰的经验使人们注意到,为节省稀缺资源,应利用大型收集者和评估者,而不是只接受情报的其他政府客户。新西兰与其他五眼议会情报委员会的不同之处在于,它只允许有限的访问敏感的业务事项或信息。对立法的强制性定期审查为评估效力和提出全面改进建议以创新机构和做法提供了机会。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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