A study on manager incentive effect based on principal-agent relationship

Shang Yu-fang
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Abstract

Based on existing researches on incentive measures of listed companies, this paper explains the significance of incentive plans for China's listed companies and demonstrates the incentive compensation model as a mature and widely used measure in China to create corporate value. In the empirical analysis, it's found that the proportion of managerial ownership in China is low, indicating that the equity incentive isn't the first choice for listed companies in China. The results of this analysis provide main reference for listed companies in future with equity incentive plans.
基于委托代理关系的管理者激励效应研究
本文在对上市公司激励措施已有研究的基础上,阐述了激励计划对中国上市公司的意义,并论证了激励薪酬模式作为一种成熟的、在中国被广泛应用的企业价值创造手段。在实证分析中,我们发现中国的管理层持股比例较低,说明股权激励并不是中国上市公司的首选。本文的分析结果为上市公司今后制定股权激励计划提供了重要的参考。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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