Arbitration and Offshore Resources in Disputed Maritime Areas

T. Morgandi
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Abstract

This chapter studies the role of arbitration for offshore resources in disputed maritime areas. It is an observable fact that disputes over maritime boundaries are mostly caused by competing desires of states to exploit offshore natural resources, in particular oil and gas deposits. Indeed, it is well known that the law on maritime boundaries was developed precisely in order to allocate rights over offshore natural resources. However, it has also long been observed that the law on maritime boundary delimitation, as developed by international tribunals, ostensibly pays only scant regard to this underlying basis of the disputes at issue. Rather, the law purports to base itself on other principles. In particular, the unilateral activities of the parties are consistently rejected as being ‘relevant circumstances’ relevant to a boundary delimitation. However, if one looks at what tribunals do, instead of what they say they do, it seems that in fact the unilateral activities of the parties concerning the exploitation of offshore hydrocarbons play a rather larger role. Whenever tribunals have some discretion, they invariably choose a delimitation line that gives oil and gas deposits to those parties that have taken the initiative to drill them unilaterally, provided that this drilling has taken place at least within a plausible boundary of the state that issued the concession. Moreover, tribunals are extremely reluctant to draw boundaries over drilled deposits, thus avoiding making them shared as a result of the delimitation exercise.
仲裁与争议海域的海洋资源
本章主要研究争议海域海上资源仲裁的作用。一个显而易见的事实是,海洋边界争端主要是由各国开采海上自然资源(尤其是石油和天然气储量)的竞争欲望引起的。事实上,众所周知,制定海洋边界法正是为了分配对近海自然资源的权利。然而,长期以来人们也注意到,由国际法庭制定的海洋划界法,表面上只很少考虑争端的根本基础。相反,这项法律声称是建立在其他原则的基础上的。特别是,各方的单方面活动一直被拒绝为与划界有关的“相关情况”。然而,如果看一下法庭所做的事,而不是它们所说的事,就会发现事实上当事方在开采近海碳氢化合物方面的单方面活动似乎起着相当大的作用。每当法庭有一些自由裁量权时,他们总是选择一条分界线,将石油和天然气矿藏给予主动单方面钻探的各方,前提是这种钻探至少是在颁发特许权的国家的合理边界内进行的。此外,法庭极不愿意为已钻探的矿藏划定边界,从而避免了由于划界工作而使它们共享。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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