{"title":"Detection of False Data Injection Attack Using Graph Signal Processing for the Power Grid","authors":"Raksha Ramakrishna, A. Scaglione","doi":"10.1109/GlobalSIP45357.2019.8969373","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we revisit the problem of False Data Injection (FDI) attacks to electric power systems synchrophasors measurements through the lens of graph signal processing (GSP). First, we introduce a physics based model that supports the empirical evidence that Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) data are low-pass graph signals. This insight is used to investigate how one can leverage such a structure to construct more effective bad data detection (BDD) algorithms that can detect FDI attack signatures through appropriate utilization of the features of the PMU graph-signal.","PeriodicalId":221378,"journal":{"name":"2019 IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing (GlobalSIP)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"17","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2019 IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing (GlobalSIP)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/GlobalSIP45357.2019.8969373","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 17
Abstract
In this paper we revisit the problem of False Data Injection (FDI) attacks to electric power systems synchrophasors measurements through the lens of graph signal processing (GSP). First, we introduce a physics based model that supports the empirical evidence that Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) data are low-pass graph signals. This insight is used to investigate how one can leverage such a structure to construct more effective bad data detection (BDD) algorithms that can detect FDI attack signatures through appropriate utilization of the features of the PMU graph-signal.