{"title":"Why Investor Trust (and Not the Law) Matters: Japanese Lifetime Employment's Role as a Non-Legal Mechanism for Credible Investor Trust","authors":"Dan W. Puchniak","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2318953","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Schleifer, and Robert Vishny (the “Gang of Four”) have captivated comparative corporate law scholars with their empirical research which claims to prove that ‘law’ is the key to economic development. A foundational principle in their theory is that legal protections for investors are necessary for larger financial markets and economic growth. The Gang of Four reason that rational investors will not trust corporate management and in turn, will not invest without strong legal protections. Post-war Japan is one of the wealthiest countries in the world. For over half a century it has built and maintained one of the world’s most successful financial markets. Even after the bubble burst, empirical studies that measure the size, liquidity, depth and efficiency of Japan’s financial market consistently rank it among the ‘elites’ of the world. Based on the Gang of Four’s theory, post-war Japan must have provided vigorous legal protections for investors. In fact, the opposite is true. A hallmark of post-war Japanese corporate governance is its extremely weak investor protection. Shareholder rights have been scarcely exercised and Japan’s largest creditors often voluntarily subrogate their limited creditor rights. The obvious question that arises is: why have investors so wholeheartedly trusted management in post-war Japan? Lifetime employment provides the answer. Japan’s post-war lifetime employment system inextricably ties the financial and social future of corporate management to the success of the company. This ensures investors that management is credibly constrained from self-enrichment and motivated to maximize performance. With such an assurance, it makes rational sense for investors to invest. Importantly, law plays merely a complementary role in lifetime employment. This demonstrates that the Gang of Four’s theory — that ‘law’ is critical in the development of successful financial markets — is incorrect.","PeriodicalId":114900,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Corporate Governance International (Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2008-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"LSN: Corporate Governance International (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2318953","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Schleifer, and Robert Vishny (the “Gang of Four”) have captivated comparative corporate law scholars with their empirical research which claims to prove that ‘law’ is the key to economic development. A foundational principle in their theory is that legal protections for investors are necessary for larger financial markets and economic growth. The Gang of Four reason that rational investors will not trust corporate management and in turn, will not invest without strong legal protections. Post-war Japan is one of the wealthiest countries in the world. For over half a century it has built and maintained one of the world’s most successful financial markets. Even after the bubble burst, empirical studies that measure the size, liquidity, depth and efficiency of Japan’s financial market consistently rank it among the ‘elites’ of the world. Based on the Gang of Four’s theory, post-war Japan must have provided vigorous legal protections for investors. In fact, the opposite is true. A hallmark of post-war Japanese corporate governance is its extremely weak investor protection. Shareholder rights have been scarcely exercised and Japan’s largest creditors often voluntarily subrogate their limited creditor rights. The obvious question that arises is: why have investors so wholeheartedly trusted management in post-war Japan? Lifetime employment provides the answer. Japan’s post-war lifetime employment system inextricably ties the financial and social future of corporate management to the success of the company. This ensures investors that management is credibly constrained from self-enrichment and motivated to maximize performance. With such an assurance, it makes rational sense for investors to invest. Importantly, law plays merely a complementary role in lifetime employment. This demonstrates that the Gang of Four’s theory — that ‘law’ is critical in the development of successful financial markets — is incorrect.
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Schleifer和Robert Vishny(“Gang of Four”)以他们的实证研究吸引了比较公司法学者,他们声称证明“法律”是经济发展的关键。他们理论的一个基本原则是,对投资者的法律保护对于更大的金融市场和经济增长是必要的。“四人帮”的理由是,理性的投资者不会信任企业管理层,反过来,如果没有强有力的法律保护,他们也不会投资。战后的日本是世界上最富有的国家之一。半个多世纪以来,它建立并维持着世界上最成功的金融市场之一。即使在泡沫破裂后,衡量日本金融市场规模、流动性、深度和效率的实证研究仍将其列为世界“精英”之一。根据“四人帮”的理论,战后的日本一定为投资者提供了强有力的法律保护。事实上,情况正好相反。战后日本公司治理的一个特点是对投资者的保护极其薄弱。股东权利几乎没有得到行使,日本最大的债权人往往自愿放弃其有限的债权。由此产生的一个显而易见的问题是:为什么投资者如此全心全意地信任战后日本的管理层?终身雇佣提供了答案。日本战后的终身雇佣制度将企业管理的财务和社会未来与企业的成功不可分割地联系在一起。这就向投资者保证了,管理层是可信的,不会自私自利,并有动力实现业绩最大化。有了这样的保证,投资者投资就有了理性。重要的是,法律在终身雇佣制中只起补充作用。这表明“四人帮”的理论——“法律”对成功的金融市场的发展至关重要——是不正确的。