VIP: Safeguard Value Invariant Property for Thwarting Critical Memory Corruption Attacks

Mohannad Ismail, Jinwoo Yom, Christopher Jelesnianski, Yeongjin Jang, Changwoo Min
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

Most modern software attacks are rooted in memory corruption vulnerabilities, which are capable of altering security-sensitive data (e.g., function pointers) to unintended values. This paper introduces a new security property, the Value Invariant Property (VIP), and HyperSpace, our prototype that enforces VIP on security-sensitive data. HyperSpace safeguards the integrity of "data values" instead of enforcing control/data flow, allowing for low runtime overhead, yet defeating critical attacks effectively. We implement four representative security policies including Control Flow Integrity (VIP-CFI), Code Pointer Integrity (VIP-CPI), Virtual function Table protection (VIP-VTPtr), and heap metadata protection based on HyperSpace. We evaluate HyperSpace with SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks and real-world applications (NGINX and PostgreSQL) and test how HyperSpace defeats memory corruption-based attacks, including three real-world exploits and six attacks that bypass existing defenses (COOP, heap exploits, etc.). Our experimental evaluation shows that HyperSpace successfully stops all these attacks with low runtime overhead: 0.88% and 6.18% average performance overhead for VIP-CFI and VIP-CPI, respectively, and overall approximately 13.18% memory overhead with VIP-CPI in SPEC CPU2006.
VIP:用于阻止临界内存损坏攻击的保障值不变属性
大多数现代软件攻击都植根于内存损坏漏洞,它能够将安全敏感数据(例如,函数指针)更改为意想不到的值。本文介绍了一种新的安全属性——值不变属性(Value Invariant property, VIP)和HyperSpace, HyperSpace是我们在安全敏感数据上实现VIP的原型。HyperSpace保护“数据值”的完整性,而不是强制控制/数据流,允许低运行时开销,但有效地击败关键攻击。我们实现了四种具有代表性的安全策略,包括控制流完整性(VIP-CFI)、代码指针完整性(VIP-CPI)、虚拟函数表保护(VIP-VTPtr)和基于HyperSpace的堆元数据保护。我们使用SPEC CPU2006基准测试和实际应用程序(NGINX和PostgreSQL)来评估HyperSpace,并测试HyperSpace如何击败基于内存损坏的攻击,包括三个实际利用和六个绕过现有防御(COOP,堆利用等)的攻击。我们的实验评估表明,HyperSpace以较低的运行时开销成功地阻止了所有这些攻击:VIP-CFI和VIP-CPI的平均性能开销分别为0.88%和6.18%,SPEC CPU2006中VIP-CPI的总体内存开销约为13.18%。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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