Denial of Service Elusion (DoSE): Keeping Clients Connected for Less

Paul C. Wood, Christopher N. Gutierrez, S. Bagchi
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引用次数: 32

Abstract

Denial of Service (DoS) attacks continue to grow in magnitude, duration, and frequency increasing the demand for techniques to protect services from disruption, especially at a low cost. We present Denial of Service Elusion (DoSE) as an inexpensive method for mitigating network layer attacks by utilizing cloud infrastructure and content delivery networks to protect services from disruption. DoSE uses these services to create a relay network between the client and the protected service that evades attack by selectively releasing IP address information. DoSE incorporates client reputation as a function of prior behavior to stop attackers along with a feedback controller to limit costs. We evaluate DoSE by modeling relays, clients, and attackers in an agent-based MATLAB simulator. The results show DoSE can mitigate a single-insider attack on 1,000 legitimate clients in 3.9 minutes while satisfying an average of 88.2% of requests during the attack.
拒绝服务规避(DoSE):保持客户端连接时间更短
拒绝服务(DoS)攻击的规模、持续时间和频率持续增长,增加了对保护服务免受中断的技术的需求,特别是在低成本的情况下。我们提出拒绝服务规避(DoSE)作为一种廉价的方法,通过利用云基础设施和内容交付网络来保护服务免受中断,从而减轻网络层攻击。DoSE利用这些服务在客户端和被保护服务之间建立一个中继网络,通过选择性地释放IP地址信息来规避攻击。DoSE将客户信誉作为先前行为的函数来阻止攻击者,并使用反馈控制器来限制成本。我们通过在基于代理的MATLAB模拟器中建模中继、客户端和攻击者来评估DoSE。结果表明,DoSE可以在3.9分钟内减轻针对1,000个合法客户端的单一内部攻击,同时在攻击期间平均满足88.2%的请求。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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