Regulating Patent Assertions

Paul R. Gugliuzza
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Abstract

Recent years have seen a proliferation of statutes regulating and lawsuits challenging patent enforcement conduct. The Federal Circuit, however, has held that acts of patent enforcement are illegal only if there is clear and convincing evidence both that the patent holder’s infringement allegations were objectively baseless and that the patent holder knew or should have known its allegations were baseless. This chapter summarizes recent efforts by state governments and the federal government to control patent enforcement behavior, questions the broad immunity the Federal Circuit has conferred on patent holders, and seeks to improve pending federal legislation governing patent enforcement. In the past three years, the Supreme Court has twice overturned Federal Circuit case law embracing objective/subjective tests similar to the court’s immunity rule. A more flexible standard, focused on the patent holder’s good faith or bad faith, would not only accommodate the Supreme Court’s disdain for rigid rules in patent law, it would accord with a century of well-reasoned regional circuit and district court case law that the Federal Circuit has ignored. More importantly, a good-faith standard would allow courts to condemn the questionable tactics lately deployed by so-called bottom feeder patent trolls while still respecting patent holders’ rights to make legitimate allegations of infringement. Although pending federal legislation to regulate patent assertions would rely heavily on the Federal Trade Commission for implementation, this chapter sketches a regulatory model that emphasizes the comparative advantages of both state governments and the federal government. The federal government’s strengths include Congress’s ability to provide a uniform legal standard governing patent assertions and to clarify questions of personal and subject matter jurisdiction that arise in cases challenging patent enforcement conduct. By contrast, state governments, as well as private parties, have a superior ability to identify unfair or deceptive patent assertions and to pursue lawsuits against patent holders who violate the law. A model of cooperative federalism, grounded in these functional considerations, would deter and punish overzealous patent enforcement with minimal uncertainty about what, exactly, the law prohibits.
规范专利主张
近年来,监管专利执法行为的法规和诉讼激增。然而,联邦巡回法院认为,只有在有明确和令人信服的证据表明专利权人的侵权指控客观上是毫无根据的,并且专利权人知道或应该知道其指控是毫无根据的情况下,专利强制执行行为才是非法的。本章总结了州政府和联邦政府最近为控制专利执法行为所做的努力,质疑了联邦巡回法院授予专利持有人的广泛豁免权,并寻求改进管理专利执法的未决联邦立法。在过去三年中,最高法院两次推翻了联邦巡回法院判例法,该法采用了类似于法院豁免规则的客观/主观检验。一个更灵活的标准,侧重于专利持有人的善意或恶意,不仅可以适应最高法院对专利法中严格规则的蔑视,而且也符合一个世纪以来合理的地区巡回法院和地方法院判例法,而联邦巡回法院却忽视了这些判例法。更重要的是,诚信标准将允许法院谴责所谓的底层专利流氓最近采用的有问题的策略,同时仍然尊重专利持有人提出合法侵权指控的权利。尽管关于规范专利主张的联邦立法将在很大程度上依赖于联邦贸易委员会的实施,本章概述了一个强调州政府和联邦政府比较优势的监管模式。联邦政府的优势包括国会有能力提供统一的法律标准来管理专利主张,并澄清在挑战专利执法行为的案件中出现的个人和主体管辖权问题。相比之下,州政府以及私人团体在识别不公平或欺骗性的专利主张以及对违反法律的专利持有人提起诉讼方面具有更强的能力。基于这些功能考虑的合作联邦制模式,将阻止和惩罚过于热心的专利执法,而法律究竟禁止什么,则不太确定。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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