How Do Financial Contracts Evolve for New Ventures

T. Jenkinson, Christian Rauch, Danying Fu
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

While previous research has characterized the key features of contracts between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, little is known about how these contracts evolve over the life of new ventures. We overcome significant data challenges to compile a novel panel dataset of U.S. early-stage ventures that includes, for every company in our sample, the main financial and control rights offered to investors at each equity round. We also gather information on the characteristics of the investors and founders at each funding round. Regarding the terms associated with the first funding round, we find that in around 60% of early-stage ventures, the initial ‘Series A’ financing terms are very similar across companies. We refer to this as the default contract. Where deviations from this default contract occur, the terms are usually more investor-friendly. We then track how contractual terms evolve over funding rounds using a 3-direction classification. The ‘diagonal’ analysis compares the original share rights given to investors of each funding round at the time of the closing of each respective funding round. The ‘vertical’ dimension analyses how the rights of existing share classes are changed upon the introduction of new share classes at the closing of subsequent funding rounds. The ‘horizontal’ analysis compares the rights of all existing share classes at a given point in time. For successful companies, which have not suffered down-rounds, the default contract is often maintained across funding rounds. In such cases, we argue that post-money valuations can be a reasonable proxy for the economic value of the firm.
新企业的金融契约如何演变
虽然以前的研究已经描述了企业家和风险资本家之间的合同的关键特征,但对于这些合同在新企业的生命周期中是如何演变的,我们知之甚少。我们克服了重大的数据挑战,编制了一个新的美国早期创业公司面板数据集,其中包括我们样本中的每家公司在每轮股权融资中向投资者提供的主要财务和控制权。我们也会在每一轮融资中收集投资者和创始人的特征信息。关于与第一轮融资相关的条款,我们发现,在大约60%的早期创业公司中,最初的“A轮”融资条款在公司之间非常相似。我们将其称为默认契约。当违约合同出现偏差时,条款通常对投资者更友好。然后,我们使用3个方向分类跟踪合同条款在融资轮次中的演变情况。“对角线”分析比较了在每轮融资结束时给予每轮融资投资者的原始股权。“垂直”维度分析了在后续融资轮结束时引入新股票类别后,现有股票类别的权利是如何变化的。“横向”分析在给定时间点比较所有现有股票类别的权利。对于那些成功的公司来说,没有经历过低迷的融资,默认合同通常在融资轮次中保持不变。在这种情况下,我们认为,融资后估值可以合理地代表公司的经济价值。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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