Populism and Constitutional Amendment

Abstract

This chapter explores the relations between populism and constitutional amendment. First, it provides a conceptual map of this unruly relationship, by analysing the use, misuse and abuse of constitutional amendment by populists. The chapter claims that populists tend to reject any distinction between “constitutional” and “day-to-day” politics. Therefore, if the notion of constitutional amendment is correctly understood, populists in power usually stay at large from constitutional amendments in a strict sense: they rather prefer constitutional replacement or constitutional sabotage. Subsequently, the chapter explores possible constitutional remedies against populist (ab)use of constitutional change. Finally, the designed conceptual map will be tested on constitutional developments in the last 30 years of the never-ending debate on constitutional change in Italy. The chapter argues that there are some disturbing methodological resemblances between the populist ab(use) of constitutional change and the Italian debate on constitutional reforms. Nevertheless, the constitutional amendment procedure provided for by the Italian Constitution successfully tamed most of the populist impulses.