Snoozing Democracy: Sunset Clauses, De-Juridification, and Emergencies

Antonios Kouroutakis, S. Ranchordás
{"title":"Snoozing Democracy: Sunset Clauses, De-Juridification, and Emergencies","authors":"Antonios Kouroutakis, S. Ranchordás","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2594307","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In the last decades, we have witnessed two contradictory tendencies in lawmaking throughout the Western world: On the one hand, there is a tendency to 'juridify' almost every single aspect of society, ensuring that almost no detail is left unregulated. On the other, at times of economic or political crisis, a part of society is 'de-juridified', that is, law disappears strategically as multiple rules are temporarily put on hold, rights are suspended and courts are deactivated. This Article focuses on this ambivalence and on the role played by sunset clauses to operationalize both temporary juridification and de-juridification. Sunset clauses have often been used in common law and, more recently, in civil law countries to 'juridify' and 'de-juridify' since these legislative provisions provide that a specific piece of legislation shall expire automatically on a specific date. These dispositions can be used not only, to enact exceptional and temporary emergency measures (e.g. temporary policies to provide financial assistance to firms) but also to remove procedural obstacles that stand in the way of rapid decisionmaking. Temporary de-juridification through sunset clauses might seem at first sight an effective method to tackle emergencies, guaranteeing that extraordinary powers do not become entrenched. However, this Article demonstrates that in the past rights and institutions have been too easily suspended at times of crisis and temporary measures have often been extended beyond the original critical periods. Not surprisingly, this has had pernicious effects on the principle of separation of powers and the protection of human rights. Although the mentioned ambivalence of de-juridification at times of crisis has been perceived as a problem in multiple jurisdictions, not much attention has been devoted to it in the legal literature. This Article fills this gap by analyzing the nature and functions of temporary de-juridification through sunset clauses and explaining the risks of hasty de-juridification. This Article provides a historical and comparative account of the implementation of temporary de-juridification through sunset clauses. Based on these lessons, we suggest a normative framework to help rethink particularly the temporary de-juridification of human rights and address the negativity which is often associated with sunset clauses.","PeriodicalId":104757,"journal":{"name":"Minnesota Journal of International Law","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Minnesota Journal of International Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2594307","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7

Abstract

In the last decades, we have witnessed two contradictory tendencies in lawmaking throughout the Western world: On the one hand, there is a tendency to 'juridify' almost every single aspect of society, ensuring that almost no detail is left unregulated. On the other, at times of economic or political crisis, a part of society is 'de-juridified', that is, law disappears strategically as multiple rules are temporarily put on hold, rights are suspended and courts are deactivated. This Article focuses on this ambivalence and on the role played by sunset clauses to operationalize both temporary juridification and de-juridification. Sunset clauses have often been used in common law and, more recently, in civil law countries to 'juridify' and 'de-juridify' since these legislative provisions provide that a specific piece of legislation shall expire automatically on a specific date. These dispositions can be used not only, to enact exceptional and temporary emergency measures (e.g. temporary policies to provide financial assistance to firms) but also to remove procedural obstacles that stand in the way of rapid decisionmaking. Temporary de-juridification through sunset clauses might seem at first sight an effective method to tackle emergencies, guaranteeing that extraordinary powers do not become entrenched. However, this Article demonstrates that in the past rights and institutions have been too easily suspended at times of crisis and temporary measures have often been extended beyond the original critical periods. Not surprisingly, this has had pernicious effects on the principle of separation of powers and the protection of human rights. Although the mentioned ambivalence of de-juridification at times of crisis has been perceived as a problem in multiple jurisdictions, not much attention has been devoted to it in the legal literature. This Article fills this gap by analyzing the nature and functions of temporary de-juridification through sunset clauses and explaining the risks of hasty de-juridification. This Article provides a historical and comparative account of the implementation of temporary de-juridification through sunset clauses. Based on these lessons, we suggest a normative framework to help rethink particularly the temporary de-juridification of human rights and address the negativity which is often associated with sunset clauses.
打盹的民主:日落条款、去合法化和紧急情况
在过去的几十年里,我们目睹了整个西方世界在立法方面的两种相互矛盾的趋势:一方面,有一种倾向是将社会的几乎每一个方面都“合法化”,确保几乎没有任何细节不受管制。另一方面,在经济或政治危机时期,社会的一部分被“去合法化”,也就是说,法律在战略上消失,因为多种规则暂时搁置,权利被暂停,法院被停用。本文关注的是这种矛盾心理,以及日落条款在实施暂时正当性和去正当性方面所发挥的作用。日落条款在普通法中经常被使用,最近,在大陆法系国家,日落条款被用来“使法律无效”和“使法律无效”,因为这些立法条款规定,一项特定的立法将在特定的日期自动失效。这些安排不仅可用于颁布特殊和临时紧急措施(例如,向公司提供财政援助的临时政策),而且还可用于消除妨碍快速决策的程序障碍。通过日落条款暂时取消权力,乍一看似乎是应对紧急情况的有效方法,可以保证特别权力不会变得根深蒂固。然而,该条表明,在过去,在危机时期,权利和制度太容易被中止,临时措施往往延长到原来的关键时期之后。毫不奇怪,这对三权分立原则和保护人权产生了有害的影响。虽然上述在危机时期取消司法管辖权的矛盾心理已被视为多个司法管辖区的一个问题,但法律文献并未对此给予太多关注。本文通过分析日落条款临时去权的性质和功能,阐述仓促去权的风险,填补了这一空白。本文对通过日落条款实施临时权力剥夺进行了历史和比较分析。根据这些经验教训,我们建议建立一个规范性框架,以帮助重新思考人权的暂时丧失合法性,并解决往往与日落条款有关的消极影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信