DIVIDEND PAYOUT, DEBT POLICY AND INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONERS

Luckily Novelia
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Abstract

The role of SOE as a contributor to the state revenue and several cases in SOE that have emerged recently has made SOE the focus of the government and investors. Cases that arise include corruption, dysfunctional behavior, and other actions included in the impact of agency theory. It makes researchers interested in examining agency theory's indication in non-financial sector SOEs using dividend payouts with a dividend payout ratio, debt policy with a debt-to-equity ratio, and independent commissioners with the proportion of independent commissioners as an indicator. The samples of this study are the stated own companies in the period 2010-2019. This study uses SOE's financial reports that have been published by related SOE's using secondary data collection methods. The data analysis used a comparative test with the Kruskal Wallis test because the data was not normal. Further analysis was also carried out in post hoc tests and analysis of agency theory indications. This study indicates that there are differences in the indication of agency theory in SOE's in the sectors Property, Real Estate and Building Construction, Infrastructure, Utilities and Transportation, Mining, Basic Industry, and Chemicals, Miscellaneous Industry, and Consumer Goods Industry.
派息、债务政策和独立专员
国有企业作为国家收入贡献者的角色,以及最近出现的一些国有企业案例,使国有企业成为政府和投资者关注的焦点。出现的案例包括腐败、功能失调的行为,以及代理理论影响下的其他行为。以派息率为指标的派息、以债股比为指标的债务政策、以独立董事比例为指标的独立董事等指标来考察代理理论在非金融部门国有企业中的指示性,引起了研究者的兴趣。本研究的样本是2010-2019年期间上市的自有公司。本研究使用的是相关国有企业已发布的国有企业财务报告,采用二次数据收集方法。由于数据不正常,数据分析使用了与Kruskal Wallis检验的比较检验。在事后测试和代理理论指标分析中也进行了进一步的分析。研究表明,房地产、房地产与建筑、基础设施、公用事业与交通、矿业、基础工业、化工、杂项工业和消费品行业的国有企业在代理理论的指示上存在差异。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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