Aid Targeting in Post Conflict Nepal

Abstract

International aid plays an important role in the reconstruction of war-torn societies after the end of civil war, but its effectiveness depends on whether aid reaches the neediest recipients. We study how power sharing in Nepal's post-conflict transition affected the political capture of aid. We argue that despite the explicit inclusion of disadvantaged groups in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement from 2006 and the Interim Constitution, regions that neither aligned with the Maoist rebels nor the government during the civil war remained politically disadvantaged. A possible causal mechanism is the low threat potential of non-combatant groups, which results in under-representation during peace negotiations and in post-conflict institutions. We present statistical evidence that districts in which neither the government nor the Maoist rebels (CPN(M)) had political support during the conflict receive systematically less aid during the post-conflict period, regardless of economic need or damage caused by fighting. At the same time, support for the CPN(M) during the conflict is a significant predictor for higher post-conflict aid flows, but only in times when the CPN(M) holds government office.