Cost-Efficient Network Protection Games Against Uncertain Types of Cyber-Attackers

Abstract

This paper considers network protection games for a heterogeneous network system with $N$ nodes against cyber-attackers of two different types of intentions. The first type tries to maximize damage based on the value of each net-worked node, while the second type only aims at successful infiltration. A defender, by applying defensive resources to networked nodes, can decrease those nodes' vulnerabilities. Meanwhile, the defender needs to balance the cost of using defensive resources and potential security benefits. Existing literature shows that, in a Nash equilibrium, the defender should adopt different resource allocation strategies against different types of attackers. However, it could be difficult for the defender to know the type of incoming cyber-attackers. A Bayesian game is investigated considering the case that the defender is uncertain about the attacker's type. We demonstrate that the Bayesian equilibrium defensive resource allocation strategy is a mixture of the Nash equilibrium strategies from the games against the two types of attackers separately.