Mandatory Portfolio Disclosure, Stock Liquidity, and Mutual Fund Performance

V. Agarwal, Kevin Mullally, Yuehua Tang, Baozhong Yang
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引用次数: 91

Abstract

We examine the impact of mandatory portfolio disclosure by mutual funds on stock liquidity and fund performance. We develop a model of informed trading with disclosure and test its predictions using the SEC regulation in May 2004 requiring more frequent disclosure. Stocks with higher fund ownership, especially those held by more informed funds or subject to greater information asymmetry, experience larger increases in liquidity after the regulation change. More informed funds, especially those holding stocks with greater information asymmetry, experience greater performance deterioration after the regulation change. Overall, mandatory disclosure improves stock liquidity but imposes costs on informed investors.
强制性投资组合披露、股票流动性和共同基金业绩
我们研究了共同基金强制性投资组合披露对股票流动性和基金绩效的影响。我们开发了一个带有披露的知情交易模型,并使用2004年5月要求更频繁披露的美国证券交易委员会(SEC)规定来测试其预测。基金拥有率较高的股票,尤其是那些知情程度较高的基金持有的股票或信息不对称程度较高的股票,在监管变化后流动性增加幅度较大。消息灵通程度越高的基金,尤其是持有信息不对称程度越高的股票的基金,在监管变化后业绩恶化程度越高。总体而言,强制性信息披露提高了股票流动性,但给知情的投资者带来了成本。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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