Not Losing Major Liberal and Rawlsian Insights

I. Wallimann-Helmer
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Abstract

In this comment a challenge Kerr’s claim that a coherent expression of a ‘liberalism of freedom’ needs an extended first Rawlsian principle of justice incorporating the principle of fair equality of opportunity for two reasons. First, such an extended first principle leads to illiberal consequences by narrowing down the scope of individual responsibility for choice and effort way too much. Second, such an extended first principle misses a main Rawlsian insight, namely that in a theory of justice the principle securing basic liberties and the principle of fair equality of opportunity serve different purposes.
不失主要的自由主义和罗尔斯的见解
在这篇评论中,对克尔的主张提出了挑战,即“自由的自由主义”的连贯表达需要扩展罗尔斯的第一正义原则,其中包含公平的机会平等原则,原因有两个。首先,这种扩大的第一原则会导致不自由的后果,因为它将个人选择和努力的责任范围缩小得太窄了。其次,这种扩展的第一原则错过了罗尔斯的主要见解,即在正义理论中,确保基本自由的原则和公平机会平等的原则服务于不同的目的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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