The Deterrence Theory: A Case for Enhanced Enforcement of Directors' Duties

Oludara Akanmidu
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

How to cite this paper: Akanmidu, O. (2017). The deterrence theory: a case for enhanced enforcement of directors’ duties. Corporate Governance and Organizational Behavior Review, 1(1), 25-31. http://doi.org/10.22495/cgobr_v1_i1_p3 Copyright © 2017 Virtus Interpress. All rights reserved The Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0) will be activated starting from December, 2018 followed by transfer of the copyright to the Author ISSN Online: 2521-1889 ISSN Print: 2521-1870 Received: 26.07.2017 Accepted: 19.09.2017 JEL Classification: G3, K42, K2 DOI: 10.22495/cgobr_v1_i1_p3 This article is concerned with providing a justification for effective enforcement of directors’ duties. It aims to consider whether enforcement of directors’ duties is necessary. It argues that enforcement of directors’ duties is crucial to effective corporate governance. Drawing on the deterrence theory, it argues that there is a clear link between increased enforcement and increased compliance. Enhanced enforcement of directors’ duties is essential for securing compliance; countries therefore ought to put in significant effort to develop effective enforcement mechanisms.
威慑理论:加强董事职责执行的一个案例
如何引用本文:Akanmidu, O.(2017)。威慑理论:加强董事职责执行的案例。公司治理与组织行为研究,2011(1),25-31。http://doi.org/10.22495/cgobr_v1_i1_p3版权所有©2017 Virtus Interpress知识共享署名非商业4.0国际许可协议(CC by - nc 4.0)将于2018年12月起生效,随后版权将转让给作者ISSN Online: 2521-1889 ISSN Print: 2521-1870收稿日期:26.07.2017接受日期:19.09.2017 JEL分类:G3, K42, K2 DOI: 10.22495/cgobr_v1_i1_p3本文涉及为董事有效履行职责提供理由。它的目的是考虑是否有必要执行董事的职责。它认为,董事职责的执行对有效的公司治理至关重要。根据威慑理论,它认为在加强执法和加强遵守之间存在明显的联系。加强董事职责的执行对于确保合规至关重要;因此,各国应大力发展有效的执行机制。
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CiteScore
1.20
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