{"title":"Demystifying China’s Sanctions Behaviour","authors":"A. Poh","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv1bhg2w8.11","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 7 examines which of the five competing hypotheses as detailed\n in Chapters 2 and 3 best explains China’s puzzling sanctions behaviour.\n It finds that China’s longstanding rhetoric against the use of unilateral\n sanctions had resulted in China not being able to openly threaten or admit\n to the use of such economic tools in its pursuit of political goals. China’s use\n of unilateral sanctions under the period of examination (if at all present)\n was therefore ambiguous and unofficial, targeted at narrowly specific\n sectors, and limited in scope. Furthermore, China found itself having to\n withdraw or further reduce the extent of sanctions when other parties\n used rhetorical action such as shaming or flattery to draw international\n attention to China’s behaviour.","PeriodicalId":239203,"journal":{"name":"Sanctions with Chinese Characteristics","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Sanctions with Chinese Characteristics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1bhg2w8.11","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Chapter 7 examines which of the five competing hypotheses as detailed
in Chapters 2 and 3 best explains China’s puzzling sanctions behaviour.
It finds that China’s longstanding rhetoric against the use of unilateral
sanctions had resulted in China not being able to openly threaten or admit
to the use of such economic tools in its pursuit of political goals. China’s use
of unilateral sanctions under the period of examination (if at all present)
was therefore ambiguous and unofficial, targeted at narrowly specific
sectors, and limited in scope. Furthermore, China found itself having to
withdraw or further reduce the extent of sanctions when other parties
used rhetorical action such as shaming or flattery to draw international
attention to China’s behaviour.