Everyone Else Is Making a Mistake: Effects of Peer Error on Saving Decisions

Elizabeth A. Perry
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

This paper describes an intervention to increase retirement saving among 1,254 federal employees. Specifically, we sent two emails encouraging employees to leave the default retirement contribution amount (3 percent of salary) and start saving enough to get the full match available to them (at least 5 percent of salary). Email 1 provided employees with personalized information, while Email 2 included similar information about their peers. We find that after 3.5 months, those who received either email were more than twice as likely to increase their contributions compared to those who received no email. Results both support previous research that personalized information can motivate action and raise questions about the nuances of peer influence.
其他人都在犯错:同伴错误对储蓄决策的影响
本文描述了1254名联邦雇员增加退休储蓄的干预措施。具体来说,我们发送了两封电子邮件,鼓励员工保留默认的退休缴款金额(工资的3%),并开始攒足够的钱,以获得他们可以获得的全部匹配(至少工资的5%)。电子邮件1提供了员工的个性化信息,而电子邮件2包含了他们同事的类似信息。我们发现,3.5个月后,收到任何一封邮件的人增加捐款的可能性是没有收到邮件的人的两倍多。结果都支持了先前的研究,即个性化信息可以激励行动,并提出了关于同伴影响的细微差别的问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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