GDPR and Religious Freedoms (With Insight Into Ronald Dworkin and Competing Rights)

Abstract

In this article, the author explains that important privacy laws are not by any means absolute and unconditional. Like other rights in contemporary democratic society, they often clash with other rights (and duties), which are usually resolved by balancing. The GDPR and its direct application influence various situations (not originally and initially planned) in which requests on the basis of the right ‘to be forgotten’ cause or can cause problems for religious institutions (religious communities) when they are pressed by some citizens to implement erasure from church books and records. The author explains why this cannot be done and that religious communities cannot be treated in the same manner as business entities. Moreover, such requests can cause harm to religious freedoms and also jeopardize proper functioning of the state bodies, since in many countries, church books are not only historical but also public documents. On a theoretical level, the author examines Dworkin’s teachings on conflicting rights and values and, by using his methodology, concludes that the religious rights of citizens belong to the group of rights that require specific and more persistent protection.