PLC Logic-Based Cybersecurity Risks Identification for ICS

Mike Da Silva, Maxime Puys, Pierre-Henri Thevenon, Stéphane Mocanu
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Abstract

In recent years, Informational Technologies (IT) was massively deployed into Industrial Control Systems (ICS) mainly for its economic benefits. However, this new paradigm, converging IT and Operational Technologies (OT), brings new challenges that companies need to face. Historically, ICS had to cope with safety requirements which ensure the protection of people, environment, and assets. Now, ICS must deal with additional threats, coming from cyberattacks, in order to maintain safety. For that purpose, it becomes essential to develop new cybersecurity technologies and methodologies that allow to assess the safety of ICS against cyberattacks. In this paper, we propose a new methodology, based on Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) logic in order to identify cyberattacks that impacts the ICS safety. Our methodology transforms a PLC logic into a finite-state machine that represents the PLC behavior. Then, using this automaton, we identify which modifications in states of sensors and actuators leads to compromising the safety. Finally, we build attack scenarios from these events and the network vulnerabilities. We apply our methodology on a simple example, yet challenging to analyze by hand, and we show how we manage to scale up on a classical example from the control systems domain: the Tennessee Eastman chemical process.
基于PLC逻辑的ICS网络安全风险识别
近年来,信息技术(IT)被大量应用于工业控制系统(ICS),主要是为了其经济效益。然而,这种融合了IT和运营技术(OT)的新模式给企业带来了需要面对的新挑战。从历史上看,ICS必须满足安全要求,确保对人员、环境和资产的保护。现在,ICS必须应对来自网络攻击的额外威胁,以保持安全。为此,开发新的网络安全技术和方法变得至关重要,这些技术和方法可以评估ICS抵御网络攻击的安全性。在本文中,我们提出了一种基于可编程逻辑控制器(PLC)逻辑的新方法,以识别影响ICS安全的网络攻击。我们的方法将PLC逻辑转换为表示PLC行为的有限状态机。然后,使用该自动机,我们确定传感器和执行器状态的哪些修改会导致安全性受损。最后,根据这些事件和网络漏洞构建攻击场景。我们将我们的方法应用于一个简单的例子,但很难手工分析,我们展示了如何在控制系统领域的一个经典例子上进行扩展:田纳西伊士曼化学过程。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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