A Tale of Two Cities: From Davids Holdings to Metcash

George A. Hay, E. Murdoch
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Abstract

In 1994, the Full Federal Court upheld the decision of the trial judge to prevent the hostile acquisition of a majority shareholding in QIW Retailers Ltd (QIW) by Davids Holdings (Davids), on the grounds that, as a result of the proposed merger, the merged company would be in a position to dominate a market defined as the supply of grocery products by independent wholesalers to independent retailers in Queensland and northern New South Wales. The basic claim of the Applicants was that, as a result of the merger, Davids would be the only supplier of groceries to independent retailers in the geographic market and would, as a result, be in a position to exercise monopoly power. While the independent retailers faced significant competition in the downstream (retail) business from the integrated retail chains (such as Coles and Woolworths), the Court found that such competition would not be sufficient to prevent the exercise of monopoly power in the upstream (wholesale) business. In 2011, the Full Federal Court upheld the decision of the trial judge not to prevent the acquisition by Metcash Trading Limited (Metcash) of Interfrank Group Holdings Pty Limited (Franklins). The acquisition had been opposed by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) on the grounds that it would leave Metcash as (effectively) the only wholesale supplier of packaged groceries to independent retailers in New South Wales. The Court rejected the Commission’s claim, finding that the merged firm would not be able to exercise market power due to the constraining presence downstream of the integrated retail chains (primarily Coles and Woolworths).So we have two cases with, on the surface at least, very similar facts. Yet the outcomes in the two cases were 180 degrees apart. What explains the different outcomes? In this article, we try to identify a critical analytical difference in the way that the cases were presented to the Court and will suggest that this difference may have had a significant influence on the outcomes.
双城记:从大卫控股到梅特卡什
1994年,联邦法院支持初审法官的决定,即阻止david Holdings (Davids)敌意收购QIW Retailers Ltd (QIW)的多数股权,理由是,由于拟议的合并,合并后的公司将占据主导市场的地位,该市场被定义为独立批发商向昆士兰和新南威尔士州北部的独立零售商供应杂货产品。申请人的基本主张是,由于合并,david将成为地理市场上独立零售商的唯一杂货供应商,因此将处于行使垄断权力的位置。虽然独立零售商在下游(零售)业务中面临着来自综合零售连锁店(如Coles和Woolworths)的重大竞争,但法院发现,这种竞争不足以阻止在上游(批发)业务中行使垄断权力。2011年,联邦法院维持了初审法官的决定,即不阻止Metcash Trading Limited (Metcash)收购Interfrank Group Holdings Pty Limited (franklin)。此次收购遭到了澳大利亚竞争与消费者委员会(ACCC)的反对,理由是它将使Metcash(实际上)成为新南威尔士州独立零售商唯一的包装杂货批发供应商。法院驳回了委员会的主张,认为合并后的公司将无法行使市场支配力,因为整合零售连锁店(主要是科尔斯和伍尔沃斯)的下游存在受到限制。所以我们有两种情况,至少在表面上,事实非常相似。然而,这两个案例的结果却大相径庭。如何解释这些不同的结果呢?在本文中,我们试图找出在向法院提交案件的方式上的关键分析差异,并将提出这种差异可能对结果产生重大影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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