Nudging Payment Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment on Pay-as-You-Go Off-Grid Electricity

J. Bonan, Giovanna d’Adda, Mahreen Mahmud, Farah Said
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Abstract

This paper reports results from a randomized control trial with a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) solar system provider in Pakistan. In the default treatment, customers are told the amount to pay every month to keep the system active. In a first treatment, customers are assisted in planning this monthly payment. A second treatment discloses that payments can be made flexibly within the month. This disclosure may reduce contract cancellation by helping minimize transaction costs but may increase contract complexity and reduce discipline. A third treatment combines flexibility with assistance in planning payments. Disclosing flexibility increases contract cancellation relative to the default, but combining flexibility with planning offsets this effect. Treatment effects appear stronger among users facing high mental constraints and transaction costs. These findings support the idea that behavioral factors, such as inattention and commitment problems, lay behind the negative impact of flexibility on cancellation. The results suggest that providers of PAYG systems may face a trade-off between disclosing complex contractual features and customer retention. Planning helps customers handle the added complexity.
推动支付行为:来自现收现付离网电力现场实验的证据
本文报告了巴基斯坦一家现收现付(PAYG)太阳能系统供应商进行的随机对照试验的结果。在默认处理中,客户被告知每月支付的金额以保持系统运行。在第一次治疗中,帮助客户计划每月付款。第二种处理方法表明,付款可以在月内灵活地进行。这种披露可以通过帮助最小化交易成本来减少合同的取消,但可能增加合同的复杂性并减少纪律。第三种办法将灵活性与协助规划付款结合起来。相对于违约,披露灵活性会增加合同的取消,但将灵活性与计划相结合会抵消这种影响。在面临高心理约束和交易成本的用户中,治疗效果更强。这些发现支持了一种观点,即行为因素,如注意力不集中和承诺问题,是灵活性对取消的负面影响背后的原因。结果表明,现收现付系统的提供者可能面临披露复杂合同特征和客户保留之间的权衡。计划可以帮助客户处理增加的复杂性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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