2. Is knowledge impossible?

D. Pritchard
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Abstract

‘Is knowledge impossible?’ considers an influential argument that purports to show that we do not know much of what we take ourselves to know. If this argument works, then it licenses a radical sceptical doubt. It first looks at Descartes’s formulation of radical scepticism—Cartesian scepticism—which employs an important theoretical innovation known as a radical sceptical hypothesis. The closure principle is also discussed along with the radical sceptical paradox. If this radical sceptical argument works, then we not only lack knowledge of much of what we believe, but we do not even have any good epistemic reasons for believing what we do.
2. 知识是不可能的吗?
“知识是不可能的吗?”考虑了一个有影响力的论点,该论点旨在表明我们对自己所知道的并不了解。如果这一论点成立,那么它就许可了一种激进的怀疑主义。首先,我们来看看笛卡尔的激进怀疑主义的提法——笛卡尔式的怀疑主义——它采用了一个重要的理论创新,即激进怀疑假说。封闭原则也与激进怀疑悖论一起讨论。如果这种激进的怀疑主义论点成立,那么我们不仅对我们所相信的东西缺乏知识,而且我们甚至没有任何好的认知理由来相信我们所做的事情。
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