A Quantitative Model of International Lending of Last Resort

Pedro Gete, Givi Melkadze
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引用次数: 8

Abstract

We analyze banking crises and lending of last resort (LOLR) in a quantitative model of financial frictions with bank defaults. LOLR policies generate a tradeoff between financial fragility (due to more highly leveraged banks) and milder crises since the policies are effective once in a crisis. In the calibrated model, the crisis mitigation effect dominates the moral hazard problem and the economy is better off having access to a lender of last resort. We characterize the conditions under which pools of small economies can be sustainable LOLRs. In addition, we assess the ability of China - a country with ample reserves - to be a sustainable international LOLR.
国际最后贷款的定量模型
我们在金融摩擦与银行违约的定量模型中分析了银行危机和最后贷款(LOLR)。LOLR政策在金融脆弱性(由于银行的杠杆率更高)和较温和的危机之间产生了权衡,因为这些政策在危机中只有一次有效。在校准后的模型中,危机缓解效应主导了道德风险问题,如果有最后贷款人,经济会更好。我们描述了小型经济体能够成为可持续的lolr的条件。此外,我们还评估了中国这个拥有充足外汇储备的国家成为可持续的国际低利率国家的能力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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