{"title":"Green and Sidgwick","authors":"J. Skorupski","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198716761.003.0009","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The end of the nineteenth century saw a rethinking of German idealism led by Thomas Hill Green, and a refinement of utilitarianism by Henry Sidgwick. This chapter examines their restatements of the two great late modern syntheses: absolute idealism and utilitarian liberalism. For both, the crisis of religion was fundamental. In Green’s case this meant a return to absolute idealism, with religion at its core, and a new application to the politics of liberalism. In Sidgwick’s case it led to an implicit nihilism. Sidgwick’s analysis of normative ‘intuition’ is discussed, his thesis of the dualism of practical reason is examined, and it is pointed out that on his own penetrating account of normative warrant, neither egoism nor utilitarianism is warranted. The final section of the chapter reconsiders the role of sentiment, will, and reason as bases of impartiality.","PeriodicalId":218291,"journal":{"name":"Being and Freedom","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Being and Freedom","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198716761.003.0009","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The end of the nineteenth century saw a rethinking of German idealism led by Thomas Hill Green, and a refinement of utilitarianism by Henry Sidgwick. This chapter examines their restatements of the two great late modern syntheses: absolute idealism and utilitarian liberalism. For both, the crisis of religion was fundamental. In Green’s case this meant a return to absolute idealism, with religion at its core, and a new application to the politics of liberalism. In Sidgwick’s case it led to an implicit nihilism. Sidgwick’s analysis of normative ‘intuition’ is discussed, his thesis of the dualism of practical reason is examined, and it is pointed out that on his own penetrating account of normative warrant, neither egoism nor utilitarianism is warranted. The final section of the chapter reconsiders the role of sentiment, will, and reason as bases of impartiality.
19世纪末,托马斯·希尔·格林(Thomas Hill Green)领导了对德国理想主义的反思,亨利·西季威克(Henry Sidgwick)对功利主义进行了改进。这一章考察了他们对两个伟大的近代综合的重述:绝对理想主义和功利自由主义。对两者来说,宗教危机都是根本问题。在格林的例子中,这意味着回归到以宗教为核心的绝对理想主义,以及自由主义政治的新应用。在西季威克的例子中,它导致了一种隐含的虚无主义。本文讨论了西季威克对规范性“直觉”的分析,考察了他关于实践理性二元论的论点,并指出,根据他自己对规范性保证的深刻理解,利己主义和功利主义都没有得到保证。本章的最后一部分重新考虑了情感、意志和理性作为公正基础的作用。