Nudging Timely Wage Reporting: Field Experimental Evidence from the United States Social Supplementary Income Program

C. Zhang, Jeffrey Hemmeter, Judd B. Kessler, R. Metcalfe, R. Weathers
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

We study a large-scale (n=50,000) natural field experiment implemented by the U.S. Social Security Administration that was aimed at increasing the timely and accurate self-reporting of wages by Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients. Sending a letter reminding SSI recipients of their wage reporting responsibilities significantly increased both the likelihood of reporting any earnings and the total amount of earnings reported, though this effect decays slightly over time. However, the specific letter content—providing social information or highlighting the salience of penalties—had no systematic effect. We develop a conservative estimate that the letters generated roughly $5.91 in savings on average per dollar spent for the U.S. government.
推动及时工资报告:来自美国社会补充收入计划的实地实验证据
我们研究了美国社会保障局实施的一项大规模(n=50,000)自然田野实验,旨在提高补充安全收入(SSI)接受者对工资的及时和准确的自我报告。发信提醒SSI受助人他们的工资报告责任大大增加了报告任何收入的可能性和报告的收入总额,尽管这种影响随着时间的推移略有减弱。然而,具体的信件内容——提供社会信息或强调惩罚的显著性——没有系统的影响。我们保守估计,这些信件平均为美国政府每花费1美元节省了大约5.91美元。
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