Securitization of Taxes Implicit in PAYG Pensions

Salvador Valdés-Prieto
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引用次数: 35

Abstract

To preserve solvency, a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system needs to adjust contribution rates and pension promises over time. Currently, it is not possible to hedge in the financial market against politically determined uncertainty as regards these parameters. I consider a policy reform whereby property rights are established on the implicit lifetime tax levied by PAYG finance, and are assigned to the pension institution. These property rights are well defined if the reform also features rule-based allocation of aggregate risk, in the form of defined-contribution or defined-benefit schemes. I show that a PAYG pension system may indeed be instantly restructured so as to minimize political risk and allow financial-market diversification of risk. A side benefit is securitization of human-capital flows, which are not traded in existing financial markets. The new securities, if traded in appropriately competitive financial markets, are complementary to the Notional Account reforms of the 1990s. However, fiscal instability can increase if securitization is implemented in the absence of initial solvency and credible adoption of rule-based methods to allocate aggregate risk.
现收现付养老金隐含的税收证券化
为了保持偿付能力,现收现付(PAYG)养老金体系需要随着时间的推移调整缴费率和养老金承诺。目前,不可能在金融市场上对冲这些参数方面政治决定的不确定性。我考虑进行一项政策改革,即产权建立在现收现付金融征收的隐性终身税的基础上,并分配给养老金机构。如果改革还以固定缴款或固定收益计划的形式,以基于规则的总风险分配为特征,那么这些产权就得到了很好的界定。我表明,现收现付的养老金制度确实可以立即进行重组,以最大限度地降低政治风险,并允许金融市场分散风险。附带的好处是人力资本流动的证券化,这在现有的金融市场上是无法交易的。如果在竞争适当的金融市场上交易,这些新证券将对上世纪90年代的国民账户改革起到补充作用。然而,如果在缺乏初始偿付能力和可靠地采用基于规则的方法来分配总风险的情况下实施证券化,财政不稳定性可能会增加。
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